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RECENT TREATIES
CRIMINAL LAW-TREATY ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SWITZERLAND

The special requirements of secrecy' observed by Swiss financial
1. Switzerland has long recognized the right of individual privacy in financial
transactions and trade secrets. Switzerland's tradition of neutrality repeatedly
has made it a haven for refugees of religious, political and racial persecution. In
the 16th century, thousands of French Huguenots, including the Protestant theologian John Calvin, fled to Switzerland because of religious persecution. Some of
these refugees became bankers and had to maintain secrecy regarding their financial affairs with clients in their homeland. The ideas and practices that prevailed
in Switzerland during this era are said to be the origins of modern Swiss banking
practice and procedure. Address by True Davis, former United States Ambassador to Switzerland, published as American Comments on Swiss Banking,
PROSPECTS (No. 100, Aug. 1965) (publication of the Swiss Bank Corporation)
(portions of the address appear in 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 128 n.1 (1966)).
The modern duty of secrecy has a dual foundation in Swiss law. The prohibition
against banking disclosure is derived from article 47(b) of the Federal Law Relating to Banks and Savings Banks of November 8, 1934: "1. Whosoever discloses a
secrecy that has been entrusted to him or of which he has received knowledge in
his capacity as official, employee, agent, liquidator or commissioner of a bank,
as observer of the banking commission, as official or employee of a recognized
auditing firm, or whosoever attempts to induce somebody else to commit such a
violation of the professional secrecy, shall be punished with imprisonment up to
6 months or with a fine up to 50,000 francs. 2. If the act has been committed by
negligence, the penalty shall be a fine up to 30,000 francs. 3. The violation of
professional secrecy remains punishable beyond the termination of the official or
professional relationship, or the exercise of the profession." Federal Law of Nov.
8, 1934, Concerning Banks and Savings Banks, art. 47(b), [1971] AS 808
(Switz.), translated in Meier, Banking Secrecy in Swiss and International
Taxation, 7 INT'L LAw. 16, 18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Swiss Banking Law].
A second prohibition against economic espionage is found in article 273 of the
Swiss Penal Code: "A person who, through searching, secures a manufacturing
or business secret, in order to make it accessible to a foreign official agency, or to
a foreign organization, or to a private business enterprize, or to their agents, a
person who makes accessible a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign
official agency, or to a foreign organization, or to a private business enterprize,
or to their agents, shall be punished by imprisonment, in serious cases in the
penitentiary. In addition, a fine may be imposed." Law Concerning Economic
Information in the Service of a Foreign Country, STGB § 273 (Switz.), translated
in Meyer, The Banking Secret and Economic Espionage in Switzerland, 23 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 284, 302 (1955). The term "economic espionage" has been construed liberally by Swiss courts to bring financial disclosure within its meaning.
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institutions 2 have been the subject of criticism by United States
law enforcement agencies 3 for nearly four decades.4 These agencies'
have been frustrated in their attempts to enforce various sections
of the Internal Revenue Code6 and the Securities and Exchange
Commission Regulations 7 and most especially to curb the activities
of organized crime. The Government often has been unable to
prosecute suspects because the available evidence has been insufficient to sustain a conviction and the evidence necessary to complete the investigation' has been within the sanctums of Swiss
banks Since many members of organized crime have been convicted of tax or securities violations,'5 it is mandatory that the
Government be able to trace the flow of illegal transactions
through Swiss financial institutions. The inability to complete investigations and to obtain proper evidence has led to an increasing
concern about potential effects on the principles of self-assessment
and voluntary compliance on which the United States tax and
securities laws are based." Additionally, the use of Swiss banks as
See, e.g., Thurgau, Staalsanwaltschaft v. Drndliker, 65 BGE 47 (1939), discussed
in id. at 317.
2. The secrecy provisions apply to Swiss commercial banks, private bankers,
savings banks and quasi-banking finance corporations that solicit money from the
public. The provisions do not apply, however, to industrial and commercial finance corporations, stock exchange brokers that are not engaged in an actual
banking business, quasi-banking finance corporations that do not solicit money
from the public, fiduciaries administering estates, and attorneys and business
agents that merely take care of their clients' funds without conducting a banking
business. Meyer, supra note 1, at 300.
3. Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before House Comm. on Banking and Currency,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
4. The Swiss Banking Law became effective March 1, 1935. See note 1 supra.
5. The Internal Revenue Service, Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954.
7. 17 C.F.R. §§ 200-87 (1973).
8. Statement by Robert N. Morgenthau, former United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York, Dec. 4, 1969, in 1969 Hearings, supra note 3,
at 18.
9. The evidence would be inadmissible because the Swiss banks refuse to
furnish witnesses competent to introduce the documents into evidence because
of the prohibitions of the Swiss Banking Law. See Swiss Banking Law art. 47(b),
supra note 1.
10. Note, Secret Foreign Bank Accounts, 6 TEX. INT'L L.F. 105, 108, 112-14
(1970).
11. Statement by Randolph W. Thrower, former Commissioner of Internal
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agents to conceal the real party in interest in financial transactions
has resulted in securities violations and tax evasions when the
proceeds of illegal activities are channeled back to Switzerland and
not reported. 2 The United States has taken unilateral and bilateral measures to control these illegal transactions. 3 The Currency
and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970,1' while protecting
the banking privacy which exists in the United States,' 5 requires
certain reporting and record keeping by banks when such data may
be useful in criminal, tax and regulatory investigations or proceedings.'" Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Service' 7 requires each
Revenue, Dec. 10, 1969, in 1969 Hearings,supra note 3, at 64; statement by Irving
M. Pollack, Director of Trading and Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission, Hearings on Legal and Economic Impact of ForeignBanking Procedureson
the United States Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Hearings].
12. 1968 Hearings, supra note 11. Many of the securities violations that concern Swiss banks acting as agents for undisclosed principals involve noncompliance with special margin requirements established in Regulation T, adopted by
the Federal Reserve Board in accordance with the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934. Regulation T provides for special omnibus accounts that facilitate transactions between brokers and dealers enabling Swiss banks to deal in their own
names with United States brokerage houses and also permits brokers and dealers,
including Swiss and other foreign banks, to extend large amounts of credit to each
other. SEC Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(b) (1973).
13. Statements by Wright Patman, Democrat of Texas serving as Chairman
of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, and Robert N. Morgenthau,
in 1969 Hearings, supra note 3, at 132.
14. 12 U.S.C. 88 1951-59 (1970); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-62, 1081-83, 1101-05
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Act]. This Act is also known as the Secret Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act.
15. In the United States, no one may demand to see an individual's bank
records without consent or a summons in accordance with the fourth amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and the fifth and fourteenth amendment requirements of due process of law. See, e.g., United States
v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1967); Peterson v. Idaho First
Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961).
16. 31 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970). Under Title I of the Act and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury, individuals that carry with them more
than $5,000 in cash, foreign currency, travelers' checks, money orders or bearerform commercial paper out of or into the United States must report it to the
customs officials at the port of entry. If the monetary instrument is mailed or
otherwise separately transported, a report must be filed with the Commissioner
of Customs, Department of the Treasury. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-59 (1970); 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.23, 103.25. Title II of the Act and relevant regulations require American
banks and financial institutions to report all domestic and foreign currency transVol. 7-No. 2
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taxpayer to disclose any interest in or authority over foreign banks,
brokerages or similar accounts for taxable years beginning on or
after January 1970.18 These counter-measures, however, rely extensively on the voluntary compliance of the taxpayers. If an individual suspected of using Swiss financial institutions in the furtherance of organized criminal activities does not disclose financial
transfers to Switzerland or the existence of Swiss bank accounts,
the illegality is difficult to prove without direct evidence. Aside
from the actual discovery of a violation by United States law enforcement agencies, the only sources from whom direct proof may
be obtained are the respective cantonal banking authorities and
the Swiss government, which has promulgated the requirements of
secrecy observed by Swiss financial institutions. 9 Previous bilateral attempts between the United States and Switzerland to render mutual assistance in apprehending criminals have proven unsuccessful. 20 The Convention with the Swiss Confederation for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxation on Income 2' provides for the exchange of information for the prevention
actions involving more than $10,000 and to keep records of all transfers of more
than that amount into or out of the United States. This data must be retained
for at least two years and in some cases five years to allow law enforcement
agencies to reconstruct the flow of transactions in such accounts. Failure to comply with these provisions of the Act may result in civil or criminal penalties and
confiscation of the currency moved in violation of the reporting and record keeping provisions. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-62, 1081-83, 1101-05 (1970); 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.22(a), 103.36(c), 103.47, 103.49 (1973).
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6011(a). This section authorizes the Internal
Revenue Service to obtain financial information from all persons subject to
United States tax.
18. 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1973). The question on Form 1040 reads: "Did you at
any time during the taxable year, have any interest in or other authority over a
bank, securities, or other financial account in a foreign country (except in a U.S.
military banking facility operated by a U.S. financial institution)?"
19. For an informative discussion of the internal regulation and secrecy requirements of Swiss banking institutions see Mueller, The Swiss Banking Secret,
18 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 360 (1969).
20. Switzerland has entered into a number of mutual judicial assistance treaties with civil law nations. One such agreement is The Hague International Convention Concerning Civil Procedure, July 17, 1905, 50 L.N.T.S. 180. A more
recent example is the Swiss ratification of the European Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, April 20, 1959, 472 U.N.T.S. 186. [19671 AS 831.
Neither of these agreements allow disclosure of financial information from Swiss
banks for any investigatory or other purpose.
21. Convention with the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double
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of criminal fraud. 2 Recently there have been ad hoc disclosures in
serious tax fraud cases,2 but the exchange of information under the
Convention by its nature is limited, infrequent, and usually requires extensive and prolonged litigation.2 4 Moreover, tax information exchanged between the revenue services of the two countries
usually contains informative rather than evidentiary or documentary material. 25 The social and political dangers of international
organized crime and ineffective unilateral and bilateral cooperaTaxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, May 24, 1951, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 1751,
T.I.A.S. No. 2316 (effective Sept. 27, 1951) [hereinafter cited as Convention].
22. Articles XVI(1) and XVI(3) of the Convention provide:
"1. The competent authorities of the contracting States shall exchange such
information (being information available under the respective taxation laws of
the contracting States) as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of the
present Convention or for the prevention of fraud or the like in relation to the
taxes which are the subject of the present Convention. Any information so exchanged shall be treated as a secret and shall not be disclosed to any person other
than those concerned with the assessment and collection of the taxes which are
the subject of the present Convention. No information shall be exchanged which
would disclose any trade, business, industrial, or professional secret or any trade
process.
3. In no case shall the provisions of this Article be construed so as to impose
upon either of the contracting States the obligation to carry out administrative
measures at variances with the regulations and practice of either contracting
State or which would be contrary to its sovereignty, security or public policy or
to supply particulars which are not procurable under its own legislation or that
of the State making application."
23. The leading case on ad hoc disclosure, which to a significant extent reversed 20 years of Swiss policy, is X v. The Federal Tax Administration, 71-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 86566 (Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Dec. 23, 1970) (unofficial CCH
translation). In October 1969, the IRS requested from the Swiss Federal Tax
Administration information from the books and records of a Swiss bank on allegedly questionable dealings between the bank and X, an American citizen residing
in the United States. The IRS claimed it had reason to suspect that X had
defrauded theAmerican tax authorities and requested the information pursuant
to article XVI(1) of the Convention. See notes 21 & 22 supra.X argued unsuccessfully that there was no basis under internal Swiss law for the investigation, that
no action for tax fraud was pending against X in the United States, that Swiss
banking secrecy disallowed transmission of such information, and alternatively
that the statute of limitations prohibited the transmission of such information.
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court upheld the IRS contentions and ordered the
bank to make available all pertinent books and records.
24. See, e.g., note 23 supra.
25. See Meier, supra note 1, at 37.
Vol. 7-No. 2
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tion between the United States and Switzerland has led to the
accession by both countries to a Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters (Treaty). The Treaty establishes the diplomatic
and procedural machinery necessary to effect the transfer of information pertaining to a specified criminal matter while carefully
delimiting areas of non-applicability and discretionary assistance.
Treaty with the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance In
CriminalMatters, in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 916 (1973) (reproduced from text provided by the United States Department of
State).
The Treaty provides for mutual assistance in investigations and
proceedings for the enumerated offenses that are punishable
within the jurisdiction of the requesting state." It includes special
provisions dealing with organized crime, rules relating to the use
of documentary evidence, and proper methods of determination
and review.Y In addition to providing for the return to the requesting state of property and assets obtained by commission of enumerated offenses, the Treaty sets forth compensation for damages
incurred by a person through unjustified detention or invasion of
privacy resulting from actions taken pursuant to the Treaty.28 The
sole requisite for initiation of an information request is that the
initiating state have probable cause to suspect an enumerated offense has been committed.29 In considering a petition for disclosure
of information, the requested state applies its applicable procedures to the particular investigation or proceeding and to the certification and transmission of documents, records and evidentiary
articles2' The Swiss government expressly has retained the right
26. Treaty, art. 1(1).
27. A survey of the Treaty provisions includes: Ch. I. Applicability-General
Obligations, Nonapplicability, Discretionary Assistance, Compulsory Measures,
Limitations on Use of Information; Ch. II. Organized Crime; Ch. III. Obligations
of the Requested State in Executing Requests; Ch. IV. Obligations of the Request-

ing State; Ch. V. Documents, Records and Articles of Evidence; Ch. VI. Service;
Ch. VII. General Procedures; Ch. VIII. Notice and Review; Ch. IX. Final Provisions, Effect on Other Treaties, Consultation and Arbitration, Entry into Force
and Termination; and Schedule of Included Offenses. Article 2 delimits nonapplicable proceedings or offenses including involuntary extradition or arrests, execution of criminal judgments, enforcement of cartel or antitrust laws, political
offenses as defined by the requested state and violation of military obligation
statutes.
28. Treaty, art. 1(1).
29. Treaty, art. 1(2).
30. Treaty, art. 9(2).
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to refuse transfer of information that, in its judgment, is not closely
connected to the alleged offense." The United States, however, is
allowed to establish an evidentiary connection between the information sought and the alleged offense, at which time the Swiss
government may reconsider its original refusal.3 2 Furthermore, the
initiating state has several responsibilities with respect to the information received and the individuals under investigation. The
requesting state may only use the disclosed information for the
investigative or evidentiary purpose for which the information was
originally granted. 33 No reprisals or sanctions may be imposed on
a citizen who refuses to give noncompulsory testimony34 and, if
application is made and its importance so requires, all such information and evidence must be kept from public disclosure. Articles 6 through 8, which comprise Chapter II of the Treaty, specifically deal with organized crime,36 a focal topic of United States
interest in the Treaty. 31 If one nation cannot investigate completely
an individual suspected of involvement in an organized criminal
activity, it may petition the other nation for disclosure of information pertinent to the investigation. The requesting state must have
probable cause to believe the suspect is involved in the criminal
activity and must demonstrate an inability to prosecute the sus31. Article 10(2) states: "The Swiss Central Authority shall, to the extent that
a right to refuse to give testimony or produce evidence is not established, provide
evidence or information which would disclose facts which a bank is required to
keep secret or are manufacturing or business secrets, and which affect a person
who, according to the request, appears not to be connected in any way with the
offense which is the basis of the request, only under the following conditions: a.
The request concerns the investigation or prosecution of a serious offense; b. The
disclosure is of importance for obtaining or proving facts which are of substantial
significance for investigation or proceedings; and c. Reasonable but unsuccessful
efforts have been made in the United States to obtain the evidence or information
in other ways." Treaty, art. 10(2).
32. Treaty, art. 10(3).
33. Treaty, art. 5.
34. Treaty, art. 14.
35. Treaty, art. 15.
36. Article 6 defines "organized criminal groups" as "an association or group
of persons combined together for a substantial or indefinite period for the purpose
of obtaining money or commercial gains or profits for itself or for others, wholly
or in part by illegal means, and of protecting its illegal activities against criminal
prosecution and in carrying out its purpose in a methodical manner

Treaty, art. 6(3).
37. Cf. 1969 Hearings, note 3 supra.
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pect without the requested information. Absent a clear showing of
these two requirements, the requested state may refuse disclosure
of the desired information. This Chapter involves only those persons suspected of involvement in a criminal organization, and the
requested state reserves the right to determine for itself whether
an individual may be treated under Chapter II provisions. Thus,
this Chapter attests to the fact that individual financial privacy
is still an important consideration in any disclosure," especially in
the area of income tax violation under article I of the Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Income. 9 Moreover, all investigations and proceedings under the
organized crime provisions of the Treaty are to be treated as confidential by the Central Authority 0 of the requested state. The requested state retains the right to review the determination of the
requesting state as to the applicability of Chapter H." The Treaty
handles the transfer of court and investigative reports and official
documents with a modicum of formal procedure. The production
of a business record,42 however, is accorded a similar degree of
procedural formality utilized in the transfer of individual financial
records. This higher degree of formality is necessary to preserve the
authenticity of transferred documents and monitor potential loss
38. Chapter II is limited to investigations and proceedings involving individuals who, according to the requesting state, are suspected of being involved in the
activities of an organized criminal group as a member, a manager or a participant
in any important functions of the group. Treaty, art. 6(2) (a). This article includes
public officials who have knowingly violated official responsibilities to accommodate the needs of organized criminal groups. Treaty, art. 6(2)(b).
39. See note 21 supra. In these situations, information will be furnished by
the requested state only if (1) the individual under investigation belongs or is
reasonably suspected of belonging to an organized criminal group as a member
or affiliate; (2) the requesting state believes that the available evidence is insufficient to link such an individual with crimes committed by the organized criminal
group; and (3) the requesting state reasonably has concluded that the requested
information will facilitate the prosecution of the suspect and should result in a
significant adverse effect on the organized criminal group. Treaty, art. 7(2).
40. The Central Authority for the United States is the Attorney General or
his designee. For Switzerland, the Central Authority is the Division of Police of
the Federal Department of Justice and Police in Bern. Treaty, art. 28.
41. Treaty, art. 8(1)-(2).
42. The drafters intended that any business record, book, paper, statement,
account or writing, or extract therefrom be considered a document. Treaty, art.
18. An official document, which is defined in article 19, is accorded different
treatment.
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of trade secrets. The refusal or inability of the requested state to
comply with a petition for information may be based either on a
limited interpretation of the petition by the requested state 3 or a
good faith effort yielding a negative result." The Treaty encourages
representatives of the United States and Switzerland to consult in
all determinations,15 and if difficulties arise in reference to treaty
interpretation, these representatives are to make any initial resolution. Further dispute is left to binding arbitration under the supervision of the President of the International Court of Justice or his
designee. 6
The Treaty marks the achievement of a major policy goal by the
United States and the preservation of the traditional and fundamental right of financial privacy by Switzerland. The United
States now has the diplomatic means to petition the Swiss government for information concerning the nature and amount of financial transactions between suspected members of American organized crime groups and Swiss banking facilities. The transfer of this
information by the Swiss government should result in a greater
number of convictions for tax, securities and other crimes that
heretofore have been the subject of incomplete investigations or
acquittals because the evidence necessary for conviction lay sealed
in the records of a Swiss bank. In acceding to the Treaty, Switzerland also has demonstrated that it is dedicated to the elimination
of international organized crime. Moreover, the general criminal
assistance provisions evidence strong Swiss desire not to allow national boundaries to interfere with the administration of justice in
areas outside of the special provisions for organized crime. The
schedule of offenses for which judicial assistance is available is
comprehensive and contains few exceptions" or discretionary as43. Treaty, art. 33(1)(a).
44. Treaty, art. 33(1)(b)-(c). The costs incurred are to be reimbursed by the
requesting state. Treaty, art. 34.
45. Treaty, art. 39(1).
46. Treaty, art. 39(2).
47. The Treaty specifically excludes involuntary extradition (voluntary extradition is permitted under article 28), enforcement of criminal judgments rendered
in the other state, political offenses as determined by the requested state, military
service offenses, military offenses that would not constitute an offense if committed by nonmilitary personnel in the requested state, antitrust or cartel violations,
and custom or tax violations that are not committed in the furtherance of organized criminal purposes. Treaty, art. 2.
Vol. 7-No. 2
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sistance provisions.18 There are, however, no disclosure requirements for those financial transactions and accounts not involving
organized crime. Even within the carefully defined area of organized crime, the Swiss government expressly retains the right to
refuse transfer of information. 9 To obtain information on the financial dealings of organized crime in Switzerland, the United
States must show both probable cause and the absence of a reasonable possibility of conviction without the information. Thus,
Switzerland has preserved its prudent and traditional requirement
of secrecy with respect to transactions of those who utilize its financial institutions. Because the Treaty was drafted in two different
legal environments, conflicts may rise under it. The limitation on
use of any disclosed information to investigations or proceedings
for which the information originally was granted does not coincide with the United States rule of evidence that allows official
written statements and certificates to be introduced in other proceedings. 5' Additionally, financial information concerning a suspect that is disclosed under the Treaty provisions pertaining to
organized crime 52 may not be introduced in an investigation of
another substantive crime allegedly committed by the suspect.5"
When considered in light of the historical preference of the Swiss
for financial secrecy and the relatively incidental amount of criminal assistance that the United States will be called on to render to
Switzerland, the Treaty is a further accomplishment in the fight
against organized crime. The reconciliation in the Treaty of the
policy objectives of the United States in tracing financial flows
through Swiss financial institutions and the Swiss fundamental
right to financial privacy indicates that a particularized solution
was necessary and that the bilateral agreement was the most effi48. Article 3 provides that assistance may be refused if either (1) the requested
state considers the granting of the request will compromise its sovereignty, national security or similar interests, or (2) the request is made for the purpose of
prosecuting an individual other than one engaged in organized crime for offenses
of which he has been acquitted or convicted by a final judgment of a court in the
requested state for a substantially similar offense. Treaty, art. 3.
49. See note 31 supra.
50. Treaty, art. 5(1).
51. This is an exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE §§ 315-20 (2d ed. 1972).
52. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
53. Treaty, art. 2(1)(c)(5).
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cacious and expeditious manner of achieving that solution. The
Treaty has eliminated a source of friction between the two countries, and thus would seem to have strengthened the relations between the two countries, although the test of its actual ability to
resolve problems in designated situations awaits its ratification
and use. 5 Since there remain more than fifteen other nations that
maintain financial secrecy vis-A-vis foreign investigations,55 the
Treaty is significant because it may stimulate other bilateral treaties with these countries.
James H. Bloem

54. The Treaty will become effective 180 days after ratification by each country and will apply retroactively. Treaty, art. 41.
55. While Swiss financial institutions receive particular attention because
they are the most widely used by Americans who are evading the laws of the
United States, they are not the only overseas depositories used for this purpose.
For a statement of various transactional schemes between United States citizens
and financial institutions of Panama, Liechtenstein, the Bahamas, Luxembourg
and West Germany, see 1969 Hearings, supra note 3, at 8. For a description of
illicit and sophisticated securities transactions involving Americans and banks in
Hong Kong, Panama and Curacoa see 1968 Hearings, supra note 11, at 31.
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